Strategic Eurasian Natural Gas Model for Energy Security

The mathematical formulation of a large-scale equilibrium natural gas simulation model is presented. Although large-scale natural gas models have been developed and used for energy security and policy analysis quite extensively (e.g., Holz (2007), Egging et al. (2008), Holz et al. (2009) and Lise et al. (2008)), this model differs from earlier ones in its detailed representation of the structure and operations of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) gas sector. In particular, the model represents: (i) market power of transit countries, (ii) transmission pipelines in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia, (iii) differentiation among gas production regions in Russia, and (iv) gas trade relations between FSU countries (e.g., Gazprom’s re-exporting of Central Asian gas). To demonstrate the model, a social benefit-cost analysis of the Nord Stream gas pipeline project from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea is provided. It is found that Nord Stream project is profitable for its investors and the project also improves social welfare in all market power scenarios. Also, if transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus) exert substantial market power then the economic value of Nord Stream to its investors and to society improves substantially. We also found that the value of Nord Stream investment is rather sensitive to the degree of downstream competition in European markets and that lack of downstream competition might result in the negative value of the Nord Stream system to Gazprom

The More Cooperation, the More Competition? A Cournot Analysis of the Benefits of Electric Market Coupling

Market coupling in Belgian and Dutch markets would permit more efficient use of intercountry transmission, 1) by counting only net flows against transmission limits, 2) by improving access to the Belgian market, and 3) by eliminating the mismatch in timing between interface auctions and the energy spot market. A Cournot market model that accounts for the region’s transmission pricing rules and limitations is used to simulate market outcomes with and without market coupling. This accounts for 1) and 2). Market coupling improves social surplus in the order of 108 €/year, unless it encourages the largest producer in the region to switch from a price-taking strategy in Belgium to a Cournot strategy due to a perceived diminishment of the threat of regulatory intervention. Benefit to Dutch consumers depends on the behavior of this company. The results illustrate how large-scale oligopoly models can be useful for assessing market integration

Congestion Management in European Power Networks: Criteria to Assess the Available Options

EU Member States are pursuing large scale investment in renewable generation in order to meet a 2020 target to source 20% of total energy sources by renewables. As the location for this new generation differs from the location of existing generation sources, and is often on the extremities of the electricity network, it will create new flow patterns and transmission needs. While congestion exists between European countries, increasing the penetration of variable sources of energy will change the current cross-border congestion profile. It becomes increasingly important for the power market design to foster the full use of existing transmission capacity and allow for robust operation even in the presence of system congestion. After identifying five criteria that an effective congestion management scheme for European countries will need, this paper critically assess to what extent the various approaches satisfy the requirements.Power market design, integrating renewables, congestion management

Long-Run Equilibrium Modeling of Alternative Emissions Allowance Allocation Systems in Electric Power Markets

A question in the design of carbon dioxide trading systems is how allowances are to be initially allocated: by auction, by giving away fixed amounts, or by allocating based on output, fuel, or other decisions. The latter system can bias investment, operations, and pricing decisions, and increase costs relative to other systems. A nonlinear complementarity model is used to investigate long-run equilibria that would result under alternative systems for power markets characterized by time varying demand and multiple generation technologies. Existence of equilibria is shown under mild conditions. Solutions show that allocating allowances to new capacity based on fuel use or generator type can distort generation mixes, invert the operating order of power plants, and inflate consumer costs. The distortions can be smaller for tighter CO2 restrictions, and are somewhat mitigated if there are also electricity capacity markets or minimum-run restrictions on coal plants

Joint Chance-constrained Game for Coordinating Microgrids in Energy and Reserve Markets: A Bayesian Optimization Approach

Microgrids incorporate distributed energy resources (DERs) and flexible loads, which can provide energy and reserve services for the main grid. However, due to uncertain renewable generations such as solar power, microgrids might under-deliver reserve services and breach day-ahead contracts in real-time. If multiple microgrids breach their reserve contracts simultaneously, this could lead to a severe grid contingency. This paper designs a distributionally robust joint chance-constrained (DRJCC) game-theoretical framework considering uncertain real-time reserve provisions and the value of lost load (VoLL). Leveraging historical error samples, the reserve bidding strategy of each microgrid is formulated into a two-stage Wasserstein-metrics distribution robust optimization (DRO) model. A JCC is employed to regulate the under-delivered reserve capacity of all microgrids in a non-cooperative game. Considering the unknown correlation among players, a novel Bayesian optimization method approximates the optimal individual violation rates of microgrids and market equilibrium. The proposed game framework with the optimal rates is simulated with up to 14 players in a 30-bus network. Case studies are conducted using the California power market data. The proposed Bayesian method can effectively regulate the joint violation rate of the under-delivered reserve and secure the profit of microgrids in the reserve market.Comment: Received and Revised in 2023; IEEE Journa

Network-constrained models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details

Numerical models for electricity markets are frequently used to inform and support decisions. How robust are the results? Three research groups used the same, realistic data set for generators, demand and transmission network as input for their numerical models. The results coincide when predicting competitive market results. In the strategic case in which large generators can exercise market power, the predicted prices differed significantly. The results are highly sensitive to assumptions about market design, timing of the market and assumptions about constraints on the rationality of generators. Given the same assumptions the results coincide. We provide a checklist for users to understand the implications of different modelling assumptions